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The numerous studies carried out in the 50s and 60s around figures like T. Parsons (1951) , D. Lerner (1958 ), S. N. Eisenstadt (1966 or A. Inkeles (1969) , had cast the first stone of a modernisation theory on historical development that distinguished two kinds of social systems: a traditional and a modern one, the latter clearly referring to western societies. Modernisation was seen as a typically occidental process that non-western societies could embrace only if abandoning their traditional cultures. Yet, this system of binary opposition was considered too harsh and the evolutionism underlying it too naïvely optimistic. Its perspective was thus contested. (1) Social systems were not as simple and homogeneous as these theories suggested.
153 R. franç. sociol., 49, Supplement, 2008, 153-186 (1) Like J. Alexander (1994) , we may consider the avatars of modernisation theories, conceiving them as a series of "myths" or "meaningful frames" rather than cognitive description. Thus, new theories -"anti-modern" radical theories-subsequently took the opposite view of the previous, "reversing the binary code of modernisation" and associating modernity with negative qualities that were once reserved for traditionalism and societies of the past. Post-modern theories represent a new turning point to account for the deep changes in advanced societies where the revolution anticipated by the radical theories had not taken place. Post-modern theories suggest relinquishing the concepts passed on by sociological tradition in order to think out the "modern" world (Herpin, 1993) .
Consequently, many theorists highlighted the persistency of traditional values in spite of economic and political changes (Inglehart, 2000; DiMaggio, 1994) . Their studies now lead to think that convergence toward "modern" values is unlikely and that traditional values will keep on having a particular influence on the cultural changes caused by economic development. We even feel that in the latest studies, emphasis is laid even more on the preservation of strong cultural specificities, as testified for instance by the debate on "the clash of civilisations" brought about by Huntington (1996) , (Chiozza, 2002) .
This article fits into this traditional reflection but shifts the focus from a comparison of traditional and modern societies to an analysis of the latters -i.e. European societies-, thus addressing the question if differences or similarities can be found in this sample allegedly representative of the Western civilisation and modernity. We will rely on European surveys on values (2) that constitute an incomparable data source to measure and compare the Europeans' values. The questionnaire covers the domains of religion, moral standards, socio-economic and political attitudes, and attitudes towards work, family, marriage and sexuality. It certainly does not enable a deep analysis of all the domains but it allows exploring the links between the values that fall within their scope. It is precisely the analysis of these links that we want to carry out. Therefore, we will try to make sure that some general coherence stands out and reveals an underlying structure, and then see to what extent it can be compatible with the modernisation theories.
A similar attempt was recently made by Dutch researchers (Hagenaars, Halman and Moors, 2003 ) but we chose a slightly different approach. Indeed, two perspectives are available to someone using the Values surveys: either one favours the continuity between the three series of surveys, which limits the number of countries studied to the ones surveyed at all three dates and restricts the range of questions asked each time; or one rather opens the geographic scope but thus limits oneself to the very last survey (1999) and to the most recent questions. It is the second solution that was chosen by the Dutch researchers, whereas we chose to restrain the geographic and thematic scopes and compare the questions and countries studied in 1981, 1990 and 1999 as well. We will limit our analysis to the following European countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. (3) In the following analyses, each
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Revue française de sociologie ( 2) The European Values survey programme was launched in the late 70s by a group of Belgian and Dutch researchers. This programme aimed at measuring the development of European values on a regular basis and by means of opinion polls using samples representative of the participating countries. The first survey was conducted in 1981 in nine European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands). In the second wave that occurred in 1990, several other European countries were added to the survey.
The last survey was conducted in 1999 and covered almost all Europe, including the countries of Eastern Europe.
(3) Nine of these ten countries are among the first 15 countries that formed the European Union. They constitute a sample quite representative of their particularities as regards politics (socio-democratic, "liberal" or conservative countries), geography (Northern, Southern Europe) and religion (Catholic, Protestant and mixed countries). We will also use the 1999 survey later and enlarge the scope of countries studied as well as the range of questions treated. country will be considered -generally and unless explicitly stated otherwiseaccording to the distribution of its population. This way of proceeding implies that there is no reason, at least a priori, to favour national membership over other individual characteristics, like age for instance. It leads to giving more weight in the final result to the Germans for instance than to the Swedish insofar as the formers are much more numerous than the latters. One may of course question that rule to which we will come back if need be.
Method
Relying on the series of European surveys, we will try to bring out a few basic principles that would structure the Europeans' values. The creators of the survey (see Ester, Halman and Moor, 1993) did not rely on definite hypotheses related to theories that characterised each domain treated (at most, they based their theories on the general idea of measuring the development of a modernisation process taking place in European societies) and they did not retain an a priori conception of the "values". Instead, they considered that values had to be detected "by exploring a wide variety of behaviours (the answers to various questions)" (Ester et al., 1993) . The value conception that is the basis of this project is thus founded on the common distinction between attitudes and values. The latters are larger arrangements than the formers that underlie them. A complex of observable attitudes, especially through a series of questions present in the surveys we will study, is thus supposed to be explained by underlying values. Appropriate statistical techniques -factor analyses, classification techniques-will enable to reveal these underlying values that are not observable immediately through an analysis that would study each question separately or that would use two-dimension crossed selections only. The range of questions asked in the "values" surveys is therefore very wide (the base questionnaire contains more than 100 questions and requires spending more than an hour to be filled in).
In order to organise that material and before undertaking any statistical analysis, we have followed a previous work achieved on the basis of the Values survey conducted in 1990 by L. Halman and A. Vloet. (4) Thus we chose to construct a set of attitude scales valid at the three dates of observation (5) in order to coherently render a general trend of the values in a particular domain on the basis of several questions combined with each other. On the questionnaire variables selected for each domain, we first created a principal component factor analysis in order to determine the dimensions underlying the domain and to find out how to construct scales measuring the attitude that corresponds to it. Then we carried out reliability analyses to check the coherence of the scales thus created. This technical work is too voluminous to be incorporated into this article. (6) In the following sidebar, an illustration is given of how we were lead to summarise in two scales the answers given to various questions regarding religion.
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Revue française de sociologie (6) It is available for consultation at http://www.crest.fr/pageperso/lemel/echelles_values.htm.
Religious scales
In their propositions, Loek Halman and Astrid Vloet make a distinction between a "religiosity" scale and a scale of "religious orthodoxy".
Some items allowing to constitute the scale of "religious orthodoxy" were not included in the 1999 survey (belief in the Devil, in a soul, and in resurrection). It was therefore impossible to take over their proposition as it was. Moreover, it seemed a little contrived to distinguish religiosity (measured for instance through the response of a person declaring him/herself as "religious" or not or through the extent to which God is important in his/her life, etc.) and beliefs.
Our analyses on all these items show that they are indeed all highly correlated to each other and globally define the first component of the principal component analyses (see Table A ). There is indeed a global dimension, which can be qualified as religiosity and gathers all these items. A reliability analysis, country by country, of the corresponding scale confirms its consistence (see Table B ). It thus seems well justified to construct a scale in that sense: Appendice 1 specifies the information that was used to construct those scales. We have to underline that naming the scales aims at giving an intelligible meaning to the reader but, in such practices, it is advisable to refer to the detailed list of the items used in order to grasp the potential meaning of the scales.
In addition to the scales, 5 dichotomously recoded variables will be considered: a question on the fairness/unfairness of giving a higher income to a secretary who "works faster and more efficiently"; a question on the respective importance to give to freedom and equality; a question on the good/bad character of giving "more importance to the development of new technologies"; a question on the confidence one can spontaneously give to others; finally, a variable opposing the persons who agree to appear on the left-right scale with those who do not (non-respondents were reassigned to a position 157
Olivier Galland, Yannick Lemel
The second component enables to differentiate two poles of this religiosity. Some items are positively and others negatively correlated to this second component and we can oppose the ones who foster a relation with God -notably through religious practice and prayer-with the ones for whom religion is essentially associated to beliefs regarding life after death. The analyses carried out again separately on populations differentiated by their general level of religiosity (i.e. according to the level of the first factor) confirm this opposition as a whole. It is just a little less clear for the least religious Europeans. Therefore, we have finally retained a scale of "religious orientation" near to the religiosity scale that equals the sum of all the items. That scale of "religious orientation" is either turned towards the importance of God in life, or towards the beliefs in the life after death. This indicator is calculated as follows:
( ) The following analyses will be based on all the 23 variables that have been defined. Technically, we will use principal component factor analyses or correspondence factor analyses. A constant result of all the analyses is that a very stable structure underlies the correlations between the variables and can be found at the various dates (with obvious changes that will be commented upon but that do not lead to question the basic structure) and in the various countries (again with obvious statements that will also be explained). Elements of the factor structure are given in Table and Figure 1 exactly as it appears in all three surveys.
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The explanation of the structure is quite straightforward. Its first axis seems to be interpreted as indicating a permanent opposition of values, in the European societies, as regards the attachment to tradition: the scales of "Support to authority values" and "Attachment to traditional family" for instance are highly correlated to that first factor, and the Europeans first contrast with each other as they support or not this corpus that seems to be forming a system. The second axis rather refers to a degree of commitment in social life, the third one to individualism and economic efficiency, opposing the Europeans who reason in a mainly individualistic way and favour efficiency criteria (better-paid secretary, new technologies) to others who first point up collective commitment. The explanation of the first axis will substantially be developed later in the article.
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Olivier Galland, Yannick Lemel The fractal nature of the European value system
It is thus always the same variables that define the different structuring dimensions that are almost identical from one analysis to another. An object is said to be fractal if its shape remains unchanged -at least in an approximate way-at various stages of observation. It is what we notice in the European value system.
Obviously, the fractal nature of an object as a value system cannot be "proven" in the same way as a mathematical object in which structures can be shown through mathematical functions. Besides, the fractal nature of an object makes sense only in a mathematical context. Furthermore, the notion of "structure" is not itself well defined here. Yet, that idea that value systems keep their main characteristics at the various stages of observation in Europe can be well understood. We will show that it is indeed the case by comparing different groups -per date, country and subgroup of people-on which the structure can be examined. That "structure" will be approached through the matrix of correlations between scales with data analysis techniques. More precisely, we will assimilate it to the first components of these principal or correspondence component analyses.
Same structure at each period
If we carry out again the analyses presented above in the same technical conditions -same variables, same principles-but in a separate way, at each of the three dates of the survey individually, we notice that the structures that appear look very much like the average structure of Table and Figure 1. They do differ from a survey to another but certainly not so much that they suggest different interpretations from those suggested by the global analysis of all the three surveyed samples.
Thus, by way of example, in table 2 we will find 10 variables among the 23 of which the correlations with the first factorial axis are the most significant for each of the three analyses individually. These variables are the ones that "define" the first factorial axes. It appears -as a result and not at all as a presupposition or a starting point-that these ten variables are the very same ones that can also be found in all three analyses. Moreover, their order of importance and their contribution to the first axis are rather stable. Four same variables make the greatest contributions at the three dates and explain 40% to 45% of the variance associated to that first axis. At the three dates, the "moral rules in private matters" and the "support to authority values" make the greatest contributions. For each on the three sub-samples, "degree of religiosity" and "left-right scale" come just behind.
We have just dealt with the first factor and the first structuring dimension of the value systems. Of course, this is not enough to use the whole content of the structure. It would be advisable to examine the other factors as well and see if their definition can be preserved in the course of time as it is the case for that first dimension. The answer is that similar stabilities can be observed but less and less clearly as interest is given to axes of a lower rank. We will not enlarge upon them here but examples will be given later on, when dealing with differences in population groups.
Same structure in each country
The smallest degree of "fractality" would rather associate with the distribution by country. However, the similarity of the structures underlying the opinion of values in the various countries is far from being weak. Figure 2 thus presents the range of values observed in the 11 countries studied for each correlation between the 22 variables taken two by two. The similarity of the structures is obvious: if a correlation is strong (or weak) in a given country, the correlation is then very likely to be strong (or weak) too in the other ones, despite in some particular cases. A proof of it is the very strong unidimensionality revealed by a correspondence factor analysis of these eleven matrixes: the first factor of the principal component analysis (PCA) explains more than 80% of the variance and the following factors have very weak explanatory abilities. The value taken by a correlation is essentially determined by the variables between which it is calculated and it is secondarily modulated by the nature of the country concerned with, in fact, a double effect of the country. For some countries, the correlations are generally stronger (in absolute value) -like Germany or Italy-whereas for others -like Sweden or the United Kingdom-they are weaker. Moreover, there are a certain number of structural particularities that do not appear to be random or idiosyncratic and that we shall present.
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Olivier Galland, Yannick Lemel An analysis of the similarities between the eleven correlation matrixes is presented in Figure 3 that was built with a clusterian analysis. We can clearly locate subsets of countries, technically defined by the similarity of their correlation matrixes, but the connection of which does not appear random. Thus a Scandinavian group distinguishes itself -Denmark, Iceland and Sweden-and the United Kingdom seems to be close to it. Ireland, Italy and Spain present quite similar structures of opinion. They constitute what we can call a "Catholic" group. As for Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, which constitute a third subgroup, they cannot but be identified with G. Esping-Andersen's "continental" model of Welfare State.
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Revue française de sociologie Having said that, we may remind that, as subjective as they may be, the connections we have just presented are to be considered as introductive of simple nuances in comparison with a whole result that is the very strong similarity of opinion structures underlying all these matrixes and all these countries. (7) 7.8 (6) 8.4 (6) 3.7 (12) Confidence in institutions 7.4 (7) 8.5 (5) 9.4 (5) Post-materialism 7.2 (8) 6.5 (9) 4.1 (10) Attachment to traditional family 7.2 (9) 7.4 (7) 7.7 (7) Moral rules in public matters 6.3 (10) 3.0 (11) 8.2 (6) Protest political participation 2.9 (12) 1.3 (12) 3.1 (11) Importance of God 4.6 (11) 4.4 (10) 4.7 (9) 1 France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands. 2 Italy, Spain, Ireland. 3 Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Great Britain.
(7) We will also underline that differences of structures the way we mean it here do not necessarily imply differences in the average values of the variables themselves but differences in the correlations between these variables.
Same structure in different subpopulations
Our last illustration of the "fractal" nature of values systems in Europe will rely on the similarities of opinion structures of the various subgroups that we can distinguish.
For instance, do the elderly and youth constitute two population groups having structured their orientations of value differently? The answer is no, regardless of the differentiation factors considered among those available in the survey.
To prove that point, we will not take up the methods already used in the previous sections but we will retain another in order to underline that highlighting a "fractal" nature does not depend on the particular technique that is used to demonstrate it, provided, however, that we decide to rely on correlation matrixes to measure the structures. We will therefore calculate the principal components separately for each population group and then extrapolate them to the other groups. The degree to which the components thus separately calculated de facto coincide with each other in their extrapolations indicates that a similarity of structures does exist. Thus, the first component of a PCA carried out on the subpopulation of "youth" extrapolated to the whole sampling has a correlation of 0.99 with the first component of a PCA carried out on the subpopulation of "elderly people" and extrapolated to the whole sampling. In other words, these two synthesis variables are almost indistinguishable. No matter if we limit ourselves or not to a particular age group to calculate them, the result will be exactly the same.
The result we have just mentioned can be found in the same way in the case of a comparison between the most and the least educated persons, or between men and women, or between urban and rural populations, or even between the richest and the poorest households. Each time, the correlations between the first extrapolated factorial axes are above 0.99 (see Table 4 ).
The results of such a comparison also enable to precise a little what varies from a subgroup of European to another. Even though the invariance of the first two components is unquestionable, it is less clear for the third one, and even less for the following ones that will not be presented here. Overtime, we will mainly deal with the first two components that single-handedly represent 25% of the overall variability of the answers (the third and fourth components representing around 6% and the others steady decreasing). The "fractal" aspect for the first two components is thus guaranteed.
The relationships with tradition and modernity are essential elements of the Europeans' values system
The results of our analyses show that modernisation in Europe did not lead to a convergence towards "modern" values that would come to almost completely wipe out or marginalize traditional values. In fact, the opposition between modern and traditional values remains structuring and, contrarily to what was predicted by the convergence theories, this opposition less divides the societies from one another than it introduces cleavages within each of them and even within so-called "modern" societies.
Traditionalism: a globally structuring dimension?
If we follow Weber and his definitions of the various forms of rationality, "traditional" legitimacy is based on a value of the past as such. "Traditional" beliefs are first legitimised by the past. The fact that they were recognised as valid in the past is enough to have them admitted as valid in the present. E. Shils (1971) observed "an unthinking acceptance of belief". Respecting tradition means believing in the sacred nature of the customs handed over through generations and that now organise social life. It is believing in the legitimacy of the ones who called for ruling society in keeping with these customs. Yet, most of the scales that are strongly correlated to the first structuring factor can apparently be interpreted according to some problematics of respect of the past and the traditions.
Eight scales mainly contribute to define that first factor (see Table 1 ): "Moral rules in private matters" (correlation of -0.72 with that first factor of the PCA), "Support to authority values" (-0.71), "Religiosity" (-0.62), "Leftright scale" (-0.61), "Confidence in institutions" (-0.58), "Attachment to traditional family" (-0.57), "Degree of political involvement" (-0.57), and "Post-materialism" (-0.53). The two of them referring to politics will not be retained in the following analysis for the others are the ones that constitute the basis of our diagnosis.
The fact that we find the scale "Support to authority values" in that list is obviously coherent with the idea that one must respect what comes from the past. Valuing authority can be understood as the manifestation of an attachment to the stability of social environments and as a belief in the legitimacy of the persons (parents for instance) who hand these values down. It is also quite significant to find the scale of "Confidence in institutions", which refers to respect in institutions (in charge of maintaining the laws they correspond to in society).
Attachment to traditional family perfectly fits into the same frame of interpretation. Through that scale, the favoured elements are stability and hierarchy of family roles: children must respect their parents, female and male roles must be clearly differentiated. In the socialisation process, the transmission of values from the past is deeply linked to this stability of family roles: the respect due to parents conditions the respects due to the values they pass down; the mother mainly devotes herself to educational tasks.
As for the religiosity scale, we know that modern religiosity is often interpreted as a way of making the reference to past and the authority of tradition sacred (see, for instance, Hervieu-Léger, 1993) . Religion obviously plays a central part in the transmission of the sacred things of the past. It constitutes a perfect support for the transmission of accepted beliefs without being appraised by any other criterion but the fact of having been validated by the past. It is thus not surprising to find that religiosity scale correlated to that first axis.
The presence of the scale on the moral rules in private matters can also be understood in the Weberian perspective of "traditional" behaviour. First of all, it renders rather straightforwardly the wish that moral rules ruling daily life should keep on being respected today the way they were once respected. Above all, that scale can also be understood as expressing a form of opposition to moral relativism, to the idea that there would be no more "absolute prohibitions" or "taboos" (Boudon, 2002) . The attachment to past on principle would occur here through the condemnation of attitudes based on the idea that each one could choose one's moral rules. A rule should not be appreciated in terms of its contents: its legitimacy lies in its permanent character.
Finally, the presence of the post-materialism scale (inversely correlated from the other variables) can be understood through the fact that post-materialism is mostly the expression of the autonomy and individual choices allowed by the liberation from material constraints. Obviously, this idea of autonomy is deeply antinomic with the respect of tradition.
All these scales obviously constitute a whole that makes sense and appear to us understandable as the expression of the relation to tradition, i.e. of the more or less large respect due to the rules and institutions inherited from the past (the use of the words "tradition" and "traditional" is quite difficult to comprehend: see sidebar). The scales are also largely coherent with each other under a technical view only for their summation enables to construct high-quality synthetic scales of which the Cronbach coefficients show the strength. In order to facilitate further interpretations, we will hereafter use the synthetic scale obtained when putting the religiosity scale aside and summing up the five other elementary scales examined previously. Over time, we will call that scale "traditionalism scale".
Difficulties of the words "tradition" and "traditional" P. Ricoeur (1985) highlights a very pertinent distinction between the use of the word "tradition" depending on whether it is used in the singular or in the plural. The use in the plural -"traditions"-recalls the fact that everyone is in a position to inherit from one's culture or family, or from the history of mankind, etc. There is no tabula rasa and everyone relies on one's legacy from the past. A sociologist would probably talk about socialisation -thus following his/her own usage-a word that is itself synonymous with « traditions » (see dico.isc.cnrs.fr). The use in the singular -"tradition"-introduces the idea of legitimacy as well as authority. (8) This polysemy "tradition-traditions" is the cause of large part of difficulties.
Any value observed in the present and validated in the past can be qualified as "traditional" and the word is often used in this sense, as synonymous with "ancient". However, in common use, the expression "traditional values" refers to the only values that the ones embracing them consider as expressing a past that respects itself. It is quite clear that "values" cannot be "traditional" in this sense if they are not ancient (or at least considered as such by their followers) but "traditional" here, refers to Ricoeur's singular -which is also Shils' definition that is given in the text body. Among ancient values, we will only keep the ones that are legitimate in terms of ancientness.
The problem is obviously to know how well the attachment to a value, however ancient, conveys a feeling of legitimacy from the past and of respect for authority. Generally, there is little information in the surveys on the feelings these persons associate with the opinions they declare. It is in fact a widespread problem in opinion polls. In these surveys, there is also no research on the attitudes the persons may have towards the past, in terms of emotion or ideals. Therefore, we cannot but select the questions on domains that we consider are associated with feelings of great respect for the past, which raises several problems.
First a researcher may have difficulties of interpretation and make mistakes. For instance, what to think of the so-called identity attachments to religions, which are attachments based on a conscious and reasoned solidarity among people belonging to a same group and which are said to be developing? Is the past legitimatised in an attachment of this kind? Secondly and mostly, there are mostly the possible biases related to the sources themselves. Thus, the Values surveys include few questions regarding economic, political or cultural domains. However, it would have been interesting for instance to know the attitudes of the persons towards contemporary arts or towards the refusal to get into debt, etc. The insistence of the Values survey on family is very significant. The expression "traditional values" is sometimes used in standard speech to refer to the only values in terms of family and sex relations mainly. (9) In this text we are not limiting the sphere of application of the word "traditional". It may be nevertheless important to understand why the standard use tends to focus on this limited part of the value orientations and if the positions held in the matter are the touchstone of traditionalism, which certainly refers to the interpretation of the role that may have played by Christian religions in the History of European values.
(8) We do know that the passage from "traditions" to "tradition" is made through the break between Catholicism and Protestantism, the latter refusing to consider the "Tradition" accumulated by the successive interpretations of the Holy Scriptures as a legitimate source of knowledge of the divine word.
(9) It is especially the case of the United States where "traditional values" are a coded way of designating the religious and political orientations that are closely linked to the positions taken as regards abortion, contraception and alternative forms of union in a context where the weight of religious orientations on political life increases differently in comparison with Europe. For instance, see Weigel (2005) for a recent American point of view.
The inherent quality of the traditionalism scale thus created is very acceptable. The Cronbach alpha is 0.67 for all countries and dates. Its distribution is very symmetrical, approximately normal with a high proportion of European in the average area of the scale and steadily decreasing as approaching the ends of the two poles (see Figure 4) . Its correlation with the first component of the PCA summarised in table 1 is very strong (0.91). Should we consider that certain countries could be "traditional" and others "modern", and that this dichotomy would account for the overall result? There are indeed effects of composition in time or between some countries, notably Ireland, which must largely contribute to their overall significance. For all that, if we limit the analysis to the countries that are the most averagely remote from the "traditional" pole of values -France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmarkwe find again an organisation of values that is very close to the ones analysed so far. The same organisation of values goes through all European countries, rather than opposing them to each other: it's the "fractal" nature of values systems. Thus, this traditionalism scale (see sidebar for specific terminology) very well renders the first dimension of the European values system. (10) 168
Revue française de sociologie FIGURE 4. -Histogram of the traditionalism scale; all countries; all waves (10) We may consider constructing traditionalism scales that would be founded on an a priori conception of "tradition". If we do construct a scale using the variables "attachment to authority" and "to traditional family", "moral rules in private matters" and "confidence towards institutions", the correlation coefficient with the first factor remains very high (0.89). It is still very high if we add the religiosity scale to these variables (0.91).
All in all, there is a whole set of arguments that seem convincing and converging enough to help us interpret the first structuring axis of the European values systems, in the same way as the manifestation of their degree of attachment to "traditional" values. Such a result was not obvious at all, for we could have thought, in compliance with the convergence theories, that, by the end of the 20th century, modernity would have spread to the extent that the cleavage opposing it to traditional attitudes and values would have practically disappeared. It is not the case -on the contrary. Today it is still the Europeans' relation towards tradition that basically structures their values. That observation does not necessarily mean that the Europeans are massively "traditional", or even that most of them are, as shown in the distribution of the traditionalism scale.
Is modernity the antithesis of tradition?
We have defined the first axis of the factor analysis through the attachment to the past, obviously referring to one of the ends of the axis but how shall we specify if one is interested in the other end and how shall we name the other pole? Shall we call it "modernism" and then talk about THE dimension of "tradition/modernity" and consider "modern" behaviour as the mere antithesis of "traditional" behaviour? Such a definition would make modernity the strict antithetical side of respect to tradition.
De facto, Max Weber himself does not describe the process of modernisation as resulting from the disappearance of traditional legitimacy only. He considers that it takes place at the same time on the economic level -rationalisation and intensification of production-, on the political level -adoption of representative democracy-and on the cultural level -with the victory of the bourgeois values of individualism, political equality, professionalism, thriftiness and efficiency (Scott, 2000) . He may found it on the "rationalisation of the world" that does oppose to "traditional" behaviour, but without necessarily being its mere negative copy: believing in the virtues of science and calculation to plan and organise human activities, in the establishment of legal norms to codify social relations, and all the characteristics of the rationalisation process (and that are not restricted to a given area of life but embrace the whole life), are deeply contradictory with the routine nature of traditional behaviour.
Since Weber, many works, without giving up the implementation of polar models, have refined and enriched the modernisation theory, distinguishing the main characteristics defining it. N. Kumar (1988) suggested a synthesis of it, thus distinguishing five fundamental dimensions: individualism -the advent of the individual human being (rather than of the community, tribe, group or Nation) as the hub of society; differentiation, i.e. the considerably opened-up choices in education, at work and among lifestyles; rationalisation-in the tradition of Weberian theories on bureaucracy; economism, i.e. the domination of social life by economic activities; and finally expansion, i.e. the tendency inherent in modern societies to push their limits always further, especially in terms of space (to which the "globalisation" so often mentioned nowadays would be a mere contemporary interpretation).
The opposite side of the traditional pole of our factor analyses' values certainly refers to the dimensions of individualism and differentiation Kumar mentioned. It can be easily conceivable that the idea of "autonomy of the individual" opposes to that "submission to institutions, ideas, and principles" (Boudon, 2002 ) that is at the basis of traditional behaviour. The notion of "cultural liberalism" suggested by Grunberg and Schweisguth (11) stems from the same interpretative register. Finally, if we should, at this stage, name the anti-traditionalist pole of our first axis, we could use the expression of individualisation to show that it highlights the free choice and the promotion of the individual (but not necessarily of individualism). (12) But do the others dimensions of modernity mentioned by Kumar, notably economism and rationalisation, also define this "anti-traditional" pole?
The "Values" survey, which provided this article with its empirical base, rather emphasised the dimensions of individualism and differentiation (13) than, at least in its first editions, those of attachment to rationality and belief in the virtues of science and techniques. Yet these latter dimensions are not totally absent.
Two questions asked in the very first series of surveys can in fact be understood as referring -partly at least-to the dimensions of attachment to rationality. One of them concerns the attachment to "new technologies", and the other the legitimacy to better pay a more efficient secretary. The former echoes the Weberian conception of the process opposing the confidence shown towards techniques, "irrational confidence so to speak of man towards his works and creations" (Freund, 1968) to that placed in the action of nature. The latter adds up to an aspect of rationalisation process related to the development of more and more elaborate criteria of performance in economic life.
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Revue française de sociologie (11) They define this notion as follows: "A system of anti-authoritarian values, valuing individual autonomy and fulfillment, aknowledging the right for every one to choose one's own way of living, and based on the principle of equality of all human beings, regardless of race, religion, sex or social rank." (Grunberg and Schweisguth, 1990) . Afterwards, these two authors (1997) were led to revise their scale of cultural liberalism and divide it into three sub-dimensions: moral standards, attitudes towards authority, and a last dimension they defined as an universalistantiuniversalist dimension (equal values of all individuals vs. inequality of values). The two first dimensions are, according to the authors, strongly linked: they "concern the domains of moral standards and lifestyles, with one pole being the principle of freedom and individual fulfillment, and the other being the respect of tradition".
(12) In a penetrating essay on "individualism and the intellectuals" (1898) Durkheim recalls that two forms of individualism have to be distinguished: a "utilitarian" individualism (stemming from Spencer and economists) and a "humanist" individualism that does not come from selfishness but from sympathy towards everything human: "it is a religion in which Man is both the believer and the God".
(13) "[…] questions were selected which could reveal traditional values, stressing order and authority, and modern values, characterized either by the saliency of self-determination and self-development of the individual or by the freedom of the individual to make a choice between alternative ways of behaviour" (Ester, Halman and Moor, 1993 ).
Yet, these two questions are not correlated to the first factor. They contribute to define the third one (determined by the positive scales called "primacy given to freedom over equality", "better-paid secretary", "belief in the importance of new technologies", "rejection of disruptive neighbours", and the negative ones of "voluntary organizations participation" and "involvement in religious institutions"; see table 1). This result seems to show that "modernity" -understood as attachment to rational criteria, especially economic ones-constitutes a different dimension from modernity when understood as the expression, in terms of values, of the tendencies to individualism and differentiation mentioned by Kumar. Besides, these tendencies are quite well rendered by the first factor, when it comes to moral standards.
It is a result that perfectly joins Gérard Grunberg and Étienne Schweisguth's works (1990 Schweisguth's works ( , 1994 , which showed that the scales of "cultural liberalism" and "economic liberalism" they had built were negatively correlated. They explained that result through political factors, the left-wing individuals being "liberal" culturally speaking, and "anti-liberal" economically speaking, whereas it is quite the opposite among the right-wing individuals. This interpretation leaves us unsatisfied: why is it this way? After all, it could seem coherent, in the tradition of liberal thinkers inspired by Locke, like Hayek, that individualism in terms of moral standards (every one is free to choose one's own way of life) combines with the rejection of any kind of interventionism of the State that might restrict individual freedom, thus leaving the market to regulate the individual preferences and capacities. However, this scenario of "libertarianism" is not validated by the results of the Values survey.
Attachment to market and individualisation
We can go more closely into the matter and onto the contents of the relations between economic attitudes and moral attitudes, using the 1999 survey that includes new questions on the dimension Kumar called "economism". These questions can be synthesised in a scale of attitudes towards economy, opposing the Europeans according to whether they support the conception of economy organised around the central part of the State or a conception highlighting individual initiative, freedom of entreprises and competition. (14) In Western Europe, the data do not show a positive correlation between individualisation and attachment to market (or conversely between moral traditionalism and support to the intervention of the State) ( Table 5 ). The Europeans who place at the centre of their values individual autonomy as
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Olivier Galland, Yannick Lemel (14) This scale looks like the one constructed by Claude Dargent (2006) in his article on economic and moral attitudes in Europe. We agree with him on considering that it expresses more the degree of attachment to a simple preference for market than of attachment to "liberalism". Claude Dargent shows precisely that, among ordinary people, this definition is variable and that certain dimensions of what some economists mean by "liberalism" are not or slightly are correlated to that scale. regards moral rules, authority and institutions are not necessarily the same ones who believe in the virtues of individual initiative and competition in economics. The correlations are most often negative with weak values, but positive in Eastern Europe. In that case, people are probably often more suspicious towards all the components of modernisation: the one which was translated into a slackening of moral standards and the ones which go together with economic modernisation and which are able to, precisely as stated by Heath (2004) , undermine the basis of traditionalism moral and family values.
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Revue française de sociologie Negative correlations significant at a threshold of at least 5%.
Positive correlations significant at a threshold of at least 5%.
Note: In the second column of the table, the people who never worked, the self-employed and agricultural workers were excluded, in order to dismiss a structure effect in certain countries where these categories weigh relatively much. Furthermore, we took into account the fact that the combination between moral and economic attitudes is very specific among these categories (especially among agricultural workers who are very traditional in terms of morality but who are much more favourable to market than workers and other employees).
The absence of a positive link between attachment to market and individualisation in the countries of Western Europe is more difficult to interpret. We may not easily believe that this absence could stem from permanent asceticism that, according to Weber, favoured the birth and development of capitalism. As Daniel Bell had recalled it ([1976] 1979) protestant moral and puritan mind -"the two pillars that supported the traditional values system of the bourgeois society"-have been progressively eroded since the 60s not only by "changes in sensitivity but also by changes in social structure" -and notably by the development of a mass consumption economy. (15) But, even if well kept away from the ascetic current of Christian tradition, the countercultural movement of the 60s is said to have favoured the emergence of a strong aversion towards ostentatious consumption in Western societies (Heath, 2004) . Although liberal -in the Anglo-Saxon meaning-Western values would thus be anti-consumerist and anti-materialistic. According to this thesis, market economy would not be the expression of these values, but would come within an endogenous process rather than within a process that would contradict the dominant system of Western values (Heath, 2004) . The data available to us do not allow to decide on the relevance of such an interpretation, for it refers to an extensive historical depth much larger than the time period covered by the Values surveys. At any rate, it coincides quite well with the result drawn from them, namely the absence of a positive link between individualisation and attachment to market. (16) The attachment to a religious identity as a fundamental determinant of value orientations R. Hoggart (1970) explains in his famous book that declaring oneself "Christian" among English working classes of the early 20th century did not indicate an attachment to Christian faith but was a sort of moral declaration. This means that there was a time when "religion had a quasi-monopoly on the talk regarding moral (in the wide sense)" but it is now only a source among others (Boudon, 2002) . Our results however show that this source is still very present even though it is sometimes its absence that matters.
One of the questions concerning religion in the Values survey (question we have voluntarily put aside when constructing the scales) explicitly refers to religious membership "Would you say you belong to a religious denomination? If yes, which one: Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Orthodox, Other?" Catholics represent half of the Europeans,
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Olivier Galland, Yannick Lemel (15) For instance, Bell makes the following statement that is very significant to us: "The motor car eliminated many of the customs and conventions praticted in the closed societies of small towns. As shown by Andrew Sinclair, the repressive threats of the 19 th -century morale largely relied on the impossibility to avoid and escape the consequences of loose behaviour." (16) This result is much less clear, and even reversed, in Eastern Europe, especially in upper and middle classes that support the market economy as well as the modernisation of morals.
Protestants a quarter and "non-religious" 20%, the others denominations sharing 1%. (17) Of course, the geographical distribution is not random. We find again the traditional religious map of Europe: exclusively Catholic countries of the South -to which Ireland is added up-exclusively Protestant countries of the North and mixed countries in the centre (Holland being more Catholic than Protestant and Germany more Protestant than Catholic). Even though not mixed, Great Britain includes a significant minority of Catholics. As for the "non-religious", they can be found in all European countries (except Ireland), yet in various proportions from a country to another.
But this traditional opposition between Catholic and Protestant countries is, here, quite misleading. As we will show, the main division in Europe is not to be found there.
The degree of attachment to a religious identity as the first determinant of value orientations
G. Lenski wrote in 1963 that "socio-religious group membership is a variable comparable in importance to class, both with respect to its potency and with respect to the range, or extent, of its influence". G. Lenski was interested in the effects of religion on economy, politics and family life, and his purpose was thus very general. If his opinion was still valid today, we would extend it and we could find out that European values are more determined by denominational membership than by usual socio-demographic membership.
The Values surveys are unfortunately quite poor in terms of descriptive variables. Moreover, they raise the issue of comparability, the national usage not being always the same in this matter. In practice, the available variables are age, gender, age of graduation, urbanisation level of the place of residence and an indicator of the household's resource level, to which, of course, the country of residence is added.
Yet, the denominational declaration effectively turns out to be one of the very first elements of differentiation. The differences induced by this religious membership are indeed a bit slighter than the ones corresponding to one's age or education level but they are of the same order, whereas the urbanisation or resource levels are less significant -one must underline-in such a general context with a slight differentiation associated with these socio-demographic characteristics (see Table 6 ). G. Lenski's purpose in the United States of the 60s still seems topical in contemporary Europe.
It is obviously natural that religious opinions in terms of values or positions on scales that are directly linked to religion highly depend on the person's feeling of belonging to a religious denomination. In these cases, the importance of a religious membership is somehow mechanical, while the importance of this membership goes far beyond the sole religious field. It can also be found on scales that have no direct link with religion. It is also very clear on the factorial axes that constitute very general syntheses of value orientations. Thus, a segmentation analysis of the first factorial axis of an overall correspondence factor analysis, using a person's 'age, age of graduation, country and place of residence, household resources, and religious denomination, first draws distinction according to denomination (Catholic, Protestant and other denomination versus non-religious people), then according to age for the persons declaring a religious denomination (aged
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Olivier Galland, Yannick Lemel under 50, 50, or more) and to education level for others. The groupings according to religious denomination appear first for the second factor, but only after a first distribution by education level. The feeling of belonging to a religious denomination is again the first principle implemented concerning the third factor. (18) As G. Lenski supposed it, religious denomination is an element of utmost importance. However, it is not, contrarily to what he thought, the opposition between Catholics and Protestants that mainly underlies the phenomenon, at least in Europe. Figure 5 represents plan 1-2 of the PCA of which we presented the results in our introduction. The individuals polled are shown in it. The three ellipses drawn on the graph have been calculated so as to determine at least half of the persons declaring themselves as Catholics, at least half of the persons declaring themselves as Protestants and at least half of the persons declaring themselves as non-religious. This graph is very explicit. From a general point of view, Catholics and Protestants have similar opinions that are distinct from the ones of the non-religious, which of course does not exclude certain Catholics or Protestants from having similar opinions as certain non-religious people and vice versa. The two sub-populations of Catholics and Protestants overlap each other very tightly. They clearly distinguish themselves from the non-religious sub-population. That same kind of differences can be found when dealing country by country.
The fundamental distinction
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Revue française de sociologie (18) The fact that national membership appears of secondary importance may be attributed to the marginalisation of small countries by a statistical technique giving equal importance to each European citizen, regardless of national origin. To see what it is all about, we carried out clusterian analyses on sets of homogeneous persons in terms of national and denominational membership (for instance, Swedes declaring no denomination and Swedes declaring themselves Protestant or Catholic).
Then, we characterised these groups by their average opinions on the scales and/or their factor syntheses. It is fundamentally the denominational membership that defines the groupings in such analyses: non-religious people are gathered regardless of nationality in the same way as religious people. The only exception is Sweden for the differences between religious and non-religious people are weak, so much so that the Swedes are considered as a homogeneous group.
In fact, as a first approximation, Europeans seem to be divided into two -and two only-types of identities: Catholic/Protestant on the one hand versus the non-religious on the other. The basic opposition lies among the ones who declare a religious membership and the ones who don't.
More detailed analyses precising the opinions of the ones and the others confirm these results. In table 7, the average values are indicated for the various scales of the Catholics, the Protestants and the non-religious (the scales are classified by increasing values of the average values in the non-religious population). It is then very clear that the Catholics' opinions and the Protestants' are similar from the moment that they differ from the opinions on the non-religious. Obviously, the difference is particularly marked for the scales directly linked to religious beliefs (e.g. belief in God or participation in religious institutions) but the conclusions can be found again when we exclude these scales very directly linked to religion from the analysis. These are not the ones and only that introduce a difference between the members of a denomination and its non-members. We may indeed note that the differences are very slight on numerous scales. Yet these scales do not allow to differentiate the Europeans from each other on a general basis and it is not a matter of chance that the correspondence factor analyses or other similar ones do not retain them to constitute the differentiating axes of opinions but select
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Olivier Galland, Yannick Lemel others, precisely the ones that appear as particularly linked to religious memberships. (19) Two points are particularly interesting. The Catholics are more "traditionalist" than the Protestants, just as G. Lenski supposed it. But this difference is very secondary when placed in an overview: Catholics as well as Protestants are clearly more "traditionalist" than the non-religious and this in all countries (see Figure 6) . We have to recall that we constructed the synthetic scale of traditionalism by excluding religious opinions or practices: To notice that Catholic as well as Protestants are more "traditionalist" is absolutely not the result of a statistical artifact.
Then, Catholics as well as Protestants are clearly more on the right than the non-religious. Protestants are often opposed to Catholics as being more liberal and leftist but we can see it does not hold true here, at least in the minds of the 178 Revue française de sociologie Note: The gap index is calculated like the absolute difference between the scale means for "Catholic" and "non religious", related to the standard deviation of the scale.
(19) The persons considering themselves as members of the orthodoxy, Buddhism or Islam being very few in the sample (excluding Greece -see also note 10), they were not included in the tables and graphs. Their positions on the scales are very similar to the Catholics' and the Protestants '. people who think are Protestants and at the European scale. Politically speaking, everyone feels closer to the right. It is not the nature of the religious belief that matters; it is the fact that one feels one belongs to a particular denomination.
Evaluation and conclusions
Among other difficulties encountered in analyses, the one described here is that the findings might rely on numerous conventions that are needed for these analyses to be carried through to completion. The items have to be gathered, the scales constructed, using various statistical methods and techniques. The results may depend on the particular sample of countries studied, as well as on the limits and chances of the domains of opinions retained. It is thus quite useful to be able to compare different analyses wit each other, analyses having their own conventions, in order to make sure ascertain the strength of the results. Precisely, the 1999 survey, which included new questions and dealt with a greater number of countries, happened to be subjected to specific analyses, of which the conclusions (see Appendice 2 on the reliability of conclusions) seem to confirm ours. All of them show that "modernity" did not impose itself uniformly and systematically within European societies.
The thesis that predicts convergence of values by abandoning traditional values along with their replacement by "modern values" had been contested on the ideological grounds for its son ethnocentrism (Tipps, 1973) . It may also be contested from an analytical and empirical point of view, in the name of the artificial nature of an opposition mutually exclusive between the characteristics of tradition and modernity. This binary opposition supposes the 179 Olivier Galland, Yannick Lemel traditional societies to be at the same time homogenous and static. It also supposes the modern societies to have totally renounce tradition. That supposition appears terribly simplifying. As stated by Huntington (1971) , "It is false to believe that tradition and modernity are 'mutually exclusive'. Modern society is not simply modern; it is modern and traditional. The attitudes and behaviour patterns may in some cases be fused; in others, they may comfortably coexist […] . In addition, one can go further and argue not only that coexistence is possible but that modernisation itself may strengthen tradition. It may give new life to important elements of the pre-existing culture, such as religion." Our results effectively confirm his point of view. All along this article, we have seen to what extent modernity and tradition are linked in European societies and form a couple constantly under pressure in each of these societies, even if, of course, certain societies are more "traditional" than others. One of the main elements of our demonstration was to show the "fractal" nature of this structuring of values around the "tradition-individualisation" dipole. Other results that we cannot present here due to the limited frame of the article are in line with what Huntington advances: some elements, a priori belonging to the model of traditional values, seem indeed -contrarily to what the convergence theories predicted-to have strengthened recently. For instance, it is the case for moral rules in public matters, as well as for religiosity that, -when reexamined under a more individualistic viewseems to be gaining a renewed interest, thus denying the most radical theses of secularisation. (20) Generational renewal does not foster the weakening of "traditional values" in the sense that would be awaited by the supporters of an ever growing modernisation. The eldest Europeans seem to move away from traditional values more rapidly than the youngest, and among the latters, we even notice the beginnings of a return to traditional values. All these elements lead to the questioning of what the traditional pole contains and of the stability of its definition. Europeans have not given up moral freedom, but they seem to wonder about the effects of its exercise and the necessity of its regulation in public life (Galland and Roudet, 2005 the upsurge of authority values. The next works on the subject will have to explore the nature of this pressure that seems to increase between individualisation and the need for a regulation of social life. 
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GEMAS-CNRS
Protest political participation
Relation, rid of size effect, of "protest" actions on the "classic" actions (member of a party, political discussion)
Left-right scale Left-right scale in 10 positions with reassignment of nonresponses according to the position of the non-respondents on 6 scales highly correlated to each other (religiosity, private moral, public moral, family traditional, authority, materialism) and correlated to the Left-right scale
Preference for personal development
Give less importance to money Give more importance to personal development Give more importance to family life Adopt a more natural lifestyle Localism Geographical level which one feels one more belongs to (town or locality, region or province, Europe, whole country, whole world)
The smaller the geographical entity one feels one belongs to, the higher the scale value.
Attachment to traditional family
A child needs a father and a mother A woman needs to have a child to be fulfilled Marriage is not an old-fashioned institution One must always love and respect one's parents Parents must do their best for their children, even to the detriment of their own well-being
Importance of work
Number of work characteristics quoted as important
Instrumental orientation towards work
Scale opposing the items "self-achievement" with the items "material conditions"
Community participation
Membership to associations (charity, religious, cultural, trade union, political, local, human right, environmental, professional, youth) and contribution through voluntary work APPENDICE 2. -The reliability of conclusions
The survey conducted in 1999 included new questions allowing to analyse complementary domains that were not enough examined or ignored in the previous surveys. Moreover, the survey dealt with a larger number of countries and enables to take into account almost all the countries now belonging to the European Union (to the exception of Cyprus).
As it happens, this survey was subjected to two independent analyses the results of which we will now compare briefly with ours.
One of the analyses was carried out in 2005 by Gilles Capon, Nathanaël Mayo, Denis Ravaille, and Élise Tenret in the frame of a workshop we conducted at the ENSAE (École nationale de la statistique et de l'administration économique: French national school of statistics and economics). Fifteen scales are added up to the scales we used in this article and the range of countries examined is wider. Does the same correlation structure emerge from the whole? Yes, globally, except for a few details. The first axis can still be interpreted as an axis of relation to tradition and some of the new scales correlated to the first factor reinforce this interpretation (valorisation of the conformist aspects of education for example). One of the most striking differences is that public moral rules seem to separate partially from private rules. The second factor thus takes up a new consistency. It shows the attachment to civic rules as well as the confidence in democracy and the will to participate to its functioning.
The second study, which we mentioned at the beginning of the article, was conducted by Hagenaars et al. Their strategy of analysis departs from the previous one on several points. They constructed a greater number of -obviously less synthetic-scales, resulting from factor analysis with varimax rotation. Hagenaars and his co-authors consider that their data can be summarized through two dimensions only, which is obviously quite in congruence with the considerations that we developed.
The first dimension they deducted is presented as follows: "The first dimension […] appears to reflect personal autonomy […] Countries or individuals that rank high on this dimension favour personal autonomy more than authority." Here, we can find the same first dimension as the one we described. On the one hand, they put the emphasis on the autonomy pole rather than the tradition pole, but on the other, they put forward exactly the same contents as we.
The second dimension is entitled dimension of "normative religion". It is obviously not the denomination that we would have kept to define the second axis that we found and that seems to correspond to various degrees of commitment in social life. But Hagenaars et al. present this second dimension as follows: "The second dimension […] combines a number of 'normative' issues. Individuals and countries that score high on this dimension maintain strict moral standards; they highly value societal norms and institutions and stress solidarity. Civil morality is high since self-interest and illegal behaviour is rejected.
[…] Individuals and countries that classify high on this dimension can be labelled as 'normative' in the sense that religion and societal norms and institutions are highly valued." Our idea of commitment does not appear in obvious contradiction with what they suggest. It even seems quite compatible with it. In fact, it happens that, unlike us, Hagenaars and his co-authors did not introduce explicit scales of associative or other kind of participations and commitments as we did. Yet, these scales, that we distinguished, turn out to contribute to the second dimension we found in addition to the ones found as contributive by Hagenaars and us. Moreover, the definition of religiosity retained by Hagenaars et al. integrates a participation to religious ceremonies and it is probably not a matter of chance that Hagenaars finds, conversely to us, that religiosity, in the definition he retains, contributes more to the first dimension than to the second. The explanation of this difference lies probably in the fact that we better highlight participative commitment of religious participation in our mode of scale construction. All in all, then, the results seem far less different on this dimension than they may seem at first sight.
